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ABSTRACT 
The research presented within this paper was conducted as part of a two-year 
project (Project MARC) to develop and render operational a mechanism to 
assess the risk of theft of electronic products. Clarke and Newman (2002) 
proposed the use of two checklists – one to measure vulnerability the other to 
measure security, as a means of categorising products according to their 
vulnerability to theft. Consultation with key stakeholders yielded the common 
view that such a mechanism was worth pursuing, but that it must reflect the 
language of those who would use it. An extensive consultation with 
stakeholders from ten European member states ensued. Participants were 
asked to rate a range of electronic products in terms of vulnerability and 
security and to explain their ratings. Their responses were used to develop 
two checklists which incorporate a variety of factors, weighted according to 
the frequency with which they were expressed. The crime vulnerability 
checklist developed within this paper is judged fit for purpose as a provisional 
measurement but urge caution in relation to the security checklist.   
 
CRIME, DESIGN, ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS, RISK-ASSESSMENT 
MECHANISM, SECURITY, THEFT, VULNERABILITY.  
 
* Dr. Rachel Armitage is a Senior Research Fellow at the Applied Criminology 
Centre, University of Huddersfield; Professor Ken Pease is Visiting Professor 
at the University of Loughborough.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents the findings from research conducted between 2004 and 
2006 funded by the European Commission (Project MARC). The aims of the 
project were to develop a mechanism to assess the risk of theft of electronic 
products and to take steps to operationalise that mechanism. The views of the 
authors reflected throughout this paper are that the task of developing such a 
tool is vital yet daunting. It is vital to build upon the gains made within other 
sectors, to seize the opportunity presented by the shift in perceptions of 
responsibility for the reduction of crime, and to draw attention to the existing 
discrepancy between risk and protection in many consumer electronic 
products. It is daunting because in spite of extensive evidence for the efficacy 
of well-designed and implemented opportunity reduction measures, the 
problem comes when the crime to be prevented (theft of electronic products) 
is widespread but not generally devastating to its victims and when 
opportunity reduction finds itself in tension with commercial interests.  
 
Consideration for crime in design 
A proposal to develop a mechanism to measure the risk of theft of electronic 
products and to explore the feasibility of implementing this mechanism 
suggests two things. First, it implies that the theft of electronic products is 
problematic. Second, that there exists a need to educate designers, 
manufacturers, retailers and consumers about the link between design and 
crime and the possibilities of minimising future theft.   
 
As is highlighted by Clarke and Newman (2005), a wide variety of 
manufactured products (those which are CRAVED – concealable, removable, 
available, valuable, enjoyable, disposable) promote diverse crimes: from theft 
and fraud to robbery, violence and vandalism. In general, products can serve 
as tools for crime or as targets for crime. Guns and spray-paint cans are 
typically tools (for violence and vandalism, respectively) while cash, cars and 
jewellery are popular targets of theft. The advent of new products, such as 
laptop computers, mobile phones and MP3 players, by changing the 
opportunity landscape, can produce mini crime waves, or crime harvests.   
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Historically, those who design and manufacture products have largely ignored 
the crime and disorder implications of what they are producing. As Pease 
(1997) suggests, innovations go through three phases – First, design without 
consideration for the crime consequences; second, reaping the crime harvest, 
whereby criminals recognise and exploit vulnerabilities, and finally retro-fitting 
a solution (which is usually only partial). Modern examples of this include 
mobile phones (which were initially designed with little consideration for 
misuse such as cloning and reprogramming), the Apple iPod (what thought 
was given to the risks of distinguishing a high-spec product by the colour of 
the headphones worn by the user/potential victim?) and the internet (how 
much consideration was given to its use as a facilitator of crime when it was 
originally conceived?). This weakness, however, is not exclusive to modern 
technology. As Pease (1997) highlights, the Penny Black postage stamp was 
introduced in 1840, but withdrawn a year later because people were exploiting 
the fact that the water-soluble red ink with which it was franked could simply 
be washed off, allowing the stamp to be re-used. The Penny Black had to be 
replaced with a Penny Red which was franked with a black ink which could 
not be removed.  
 
A more desirable sequence of events would be that the crime consequences 
are considered at the design stage, with a regular flow of information between 
those concerned with crime reduction and those involved with the product’s 
design and manufacture. Ekblom (1997) highlights how designers need to be 
encouraged to shift their perspective from solely user to user and misuser and 
highlights how, for this to occur, crime reduction information must become 
more accessible for designers.  
 
“Much remains to be properly evaluated, and the  
working knowledge of prevention that exists is couched  
in a tangle of inconsistent and loosely defined terms  
and concepts which render it difficult for designers to  
access, to think about and to apply” (Ekblom, 1997 p.249).  
 
The historical lack of communication between those whose task it is to reduce 
crime and those whose task it is to design products has led to the 
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development of products, buildings and systems which are conducive to the 
commission of crime and disorder. In these instances, the prime objective has 
to be reactive i.e. minimising the impact of the crime harvest rather than to 
take a more proactive approach. Unfortunately, these bolt-on solutions are 
often significantly more expensive and as the crime event has already 
occurred, the victim is left both traumatised by their experience and more 
vulnerable to future crime and disorder. Recent media reports in both the UK 
and USA have begun to recognise the link between rising rates of street 
robbery and the increased use of clearly valuable products such as the Apple 
iPod. Many of these reports have also highlighted the concern that these 
thefts do not occur in isolation. A victim whose product is stolen not only 
experiences the loss of their goods (and any associated inconvenience); they 
may also experience physical injury, emotional trauma or even death.  
 
Pre-empting reservations 
Although these concerns will be discussed in more detail in the concluding 
sections of this paper, the authors feel it necessary to began the paper by 
highlighting some of the most common misconceptions about the research 
upon which this paper is based. The first relates to the belief that as stolen 
goods are often replaced with new (often superior) upgrades, why would 
consumers want their products to be secure? Whilst recognising that perverse 
incentives will encourage some consumers to take less security precautions 
(because they know any product which is stolen will be replaced with a new 
one), this argument ignores several key issues. First, not all portable 
electronic products are insured; second, the theft of an electronic product 
such as a laptop, mobile phone or Portable Digital Assistant (PDA) can be 
extremely inconvenient (e.g. by the loss of data). Finally, as was highlighted 
above, the theft of consumer electronic products will generally involve a victim 
– that victim has not only lost their product, they may have also experienced 
physical injury and/or emotional trauma.  
 
The second reservation, highlighted throughout the research, is the concern 
that offenders do not always differentiate between secure and non-secure 
products at the point of theft. Are offenders generally aware of the security 
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status of products before they are stolen, or do they simply take the risk and 
discard products which cannot be reused? This is a valid concern which is 
backed by some evidence. In their study of the theft of mobile phones, 
Harrington and Mayhew (2001) found that in only 14% of mobile phone thefts 
was the mobile phone the specific target. Whilst recognising the validity of this 
concern (as well as the need for further research into offender decision 
making at the point of theft), the authors propose that one of the most 
effective means of reducing the theft of electronic products would be to 
maximise the number of secure products on the market, thus reducing the 
odds that a bag (or other receptacle used to carry consumer electronic goods) 
will contain usable products.   
 
The final reservation raised by in the process of conducting this research is 
that manufacturers cannot be expected to design undesirable products. Whilst 
the objective of the research was to reduce the risk of theft of electronic 
products such as the iPod, mobile phones and PDAs, the aim was not to 
encourage designers/manufacturers to stop producing these desirable, 
attractive and distinctive products, rather to ensure that goods which are likely 
to be targets for theft are as secure as they are attractive.    
 
Justification for Measuring Risk 
The case for crime reduction is self-evident.  But what justification is there for 
addressing the management of crime by developing a risk assessment 
mechanism to measure the risk of theft of electronic goods to complement the 
more traditional approach of offender detection and conviction?  Why should 
electronic goods be singled out for special attention, and what effect is this 
likely to have on crime rates across Europe? The major premise of the 
advance in situational crime prevention and the new opportunity theories is 
that many individuals, when faced with the chance to make a gain (through 
criminal behaviour), give in to temptation and select the option which provides 
the greatest reward for the lowest risk. If crime is viewed as a risk to be 
avoided, the primary task facing crime reduction practitioners should be 
identifying those risks and putting interventions in place to reduce them. The 
demonstration that modifying criminogenic products can be highly effective, 
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as well as the success of risk assessment tools in other areas of criminology 
(built environment, young people, vehicle crime) sufficiently justifies the 
objectives of this task. As pre-eminently desirable and stealable, small 
electronic products provide an obvious starting point for risk assessment.  
 
As Clarke and Newman (2005) highlight, more than one hundred case studies 
have been published showing that significant declines in specific kinds of 
crimes have been achieved through the introduction of situational crime 
reduction measures (Clarke, 1997; Sherman et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2002). 
These include the reduction of car crime through the introduction of steering 
column locks (Webb, 1997) and the reduction of burglary through increasing 
physical security (Brown and Altman, 1983; Cromwell et al, 1991), minimising 
access (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1975, 1993, 2000; Brantingham et al, 
1977; Brown and Altman, 1983; Newlands, 1983; Greenberg and Rohe, 1984; 
Cromwell et al, 1991; Bevis and Nutter, 1997; Mirlees-Black et al, 1998) and 
increasing surveillance (Reppetto, 1974; Brown and Altman, 1983; Cromwell 
et al., 1991; Brown and Bentley, 1993) and a combination of the above 
(Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Armitage, 2000). Other situational measures 
include the reduction of mobile phone fraud (cloning and tumbling) through 
the introduction of user and account verification technologies (Clarke et al., 
2001) and the reduction of violent crime through the introduction of toughened 
glasses in British pubs (Design Council, 2002). As well as its effectiveness in 
reducing crime, the appeal of this type of intervention over long term, resource 
intensive offender based interventions, lays in the practical solutions it offers 
to those who are tasked with the reduction of crime. For practitioners who are 
asked to meet crime reduction targets within short timescales (with very little 
additional resources) many crime reduction theories and interventions, as 
highlighted by Smith (2000), may appear unfeasible.  
 
 “It is easy to see that happy families tend not to produce  
criminals. It is hard to see how public policy can decree  
that family relationships be constructive and positive”  
(Smith, 2000 p.149). 
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In short, the evidence for the efficacy of well-designed and implemented 
opportunity reduction measures is overwhelming, and constantly growing. The 
acknowledgement of this is evident in measures against terrorism, for 
example enhanced airport security. The central problem comes when the 
crime to be prevented is widespread and not generally devastating, and when 
opportunity reduction finds itself in tension with commercial interests.    
 
Although the task of convincing manufacturers of electronic products to think 
about the crime implications of their designs may appear daunting, particularly 
considering the troublesome trade-offs such as aesthetics, convenience and 
costs (discussed in more detail in Ekblom, 2005), there are several examples 
of sectors where steps have been taken  (either spontaneously or in response 
to government pressure) to design out crime opportunities from their products 
and systems. These include the UK Vehicle Licensing System (see Laycock 
and Webb, 2005), the banking industry (see Levi and Handley, 1998) and the 
mobile phone industry (see Whitehead et al. this issue).  
 
The Measurement of Crime Risk: Developing a Risk Assessment 
Mechanism 
Previous paragraphs have demonstrated the good chance of success which 
intervening to measure and reduce the risk of theft of electronic products 
should have. Based upon the widely accepted theoretical proposition that 
crime responds to opportunity and can therefore be reduced by blocking 
opportunities, a mechanism to measure the factors which make certain 
products vulnerable to crime is a relevant tool to enable the prediction of risk 
and therefore the targeting of resources. The case has been made for 
measuring risk and intervening to reduce that risk, the remainder of this paper 
will focus upon what format that measurement might take in respect of 
electronic products. There are two possible audiences: first crime control 
agencies who might alert consumers to risks and the precautions that could 
be taken to minimise them. These are not concerned with design 
modifications. This audience will not require precision, and risk measurement 
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directed to this audience is unlikely to attract the hostility of manufacturers, 
particularly if low risk products gain recognition as such, rather than high risk 
products attract opprobrium. The second audience comprises manufacturers 
and retailers and here the landscape is different. Manufacturers will very 
reasonably object to making costly design modifications on the basis of 
imperfect risk measurement. To anticipate a conclusion of the present paper, 
the risk measurement device which was developed as part of this research is 
less fit for purpose in relation to this second audience.    
 
The process of developing the crime risk assessment mechanism took as its 
starting point the Secured Goods by Design model (Clarke and Newman, 
2002). The mechanism was based upon two quantitative checklists, one 
which assesses a product’s vulnerability to theft in terms of how concealable, 
available, valuable, enjoyable and disposable it is. The second assesses the 
product’s security features – for example, does it contain technology to negate 
its financial value if stolen, can it be tracked and has it been field-tested for 
theft? Vulnerability to theft is indexed by the relationship between scores on 
the two indices. Products which have high vulnerability/low security will be 
particularly prone to theft; products which have low vulnerability/high security 
will be less likely to be targeted. Provided that a product scores highly enough 
on the security checklist for its predicted level of risk, it can be designated and 
marketed as a Secured Good by Design (or awarded a similar label 
depending on choice of accreditation scheme). The two checklists are 
presented as tables 1 and 2 below.   
 
Table 1 about here. 
 
Table 2 about here.  
 
Although the authors considered the proposed mechanism to be an excellent 
basis for developing a crime risk assessment tool, concerns remained. These 
related to both the content and design of the checklists as well as a more 
general concern about their implementation. Some of these concerns are 
highlighted below: 
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• Lack of flexibility – Are rigid checklists appropriate for use within the 
rapidly changing field of consumer electronics? Would this mechanism 
be able to reflect the life cycle of electronic products from innovation 
through to saturation or need to grow and evolve as offenders’ modus 
operandi changed?  
• Implementation – Could such a mechanism be completed at the 
prototype stage? How likely is it that manufacturers would be able to 
rate a product’s desirability, popularity and status before it was 
developed and advertised? Re-designing a product (to rectify poor 
scores) could be prohibitively expensive for manufacturers.  
• Subjectivity – Certain elements of the vulnerability checklist are 
subjective and open to misinterpretation. For example, what is 
fashionable to one person may not be to another; the price of one day’s 
wages will also differ greatly between those completing the checklist.   
• Inter-Rater Reliability – An informal pilot on two electronic products 
revealed a large variance between scores. For example, of the eight 
participants who completed the checklists,i the Apple iPod scored 
between 11 and 18 out of a possible 21 for the vulnerability checklist 
(both the mean and median scores were 16) and between 0 and 3 for 
the security checklist (the mean score was 1 and the median 0). If this 
variation occurred whilst piloting the checklists on an audience being 
guided through the procedure, what variations would occur when the 
checklists were being completed unaided? 
• Whose Role are we assuming? – When completing the checklist it is 
unclear whose role you are assuming. Are you assuming the role of the 
offender, the user or misuser? One example of this included the 
category ‘Concealable’. This could be interpreted as concealable by 
the thief once the product had been stolen, or to a legitimate user’s 
ability to conceal the product.  
• Products as Part of a System – The category ‘Removable’ does not 
adequately reflect the nature of many consumer electronic products – 
which are part of a system. For example, the iPod itself may be used 
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outside the home, but the charger, CD-Rom and software allowing the 
product to be used are typically not.  
 
To restate, the initial review of the extant crime risk assessment mechanism 
revealed several concerns. However, a decision was made that the essential 
principle of the original mechanism – that risk should be commensurate with 
protection - should be retained; but that the existing mechanism should be 
revised to ensure that it: a) Reflects the language of those whose task it would 
be to apply it, rather than imposing the language of criminologists; b) reflects 
the language of stakeholders from a variety of European states; c) must be 
based upon a user-derived approach, rather than imposing a mechanism 
upon key stakeholders.  
 
METHODOLOGY - REFINING AND TESTING THE CRIME RISK 
ASSESSMENT MECHANISM  
The process of revising the existing mechanism involved conducting an 
extensive consultation with key stakeholders from a variety of sectors 
representing both original and accession European states. The 
methodological steps taken are outlined below. 
 
Design of the Questionnaire 
A decision was made at the outset of this section of the project, that due to 
the need to consult with stakeholders from a mix of European states. Given 
the language limitations of the researchers involved, the most appropriate 
method for collecting information would be through questionnaires, distributed 
electronically and translated into any language chosen by participants. Face-
to face interviews would have been prohibitively expensive. Telephone 
interviews would have imposed a strain upon participants of varying fluency in 
the language used.   
 
The questionnaire was designed to collect information on both a) participants’ 
views of the theft risk presented by a variety of electronic products and b) 
participants’ views (in their own words) of what makes a product vulnerable or 
secure. These data were collected by providing detailed information on a 
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product’s price, dimensions, weight, specifications and in-built security 
features, and asking them to rate each product as low, medium of high in 
terms of its vulnerability and existing levels of security. Of just as much 
importance as the rating was the participant’s explanation for that selection. 
For this reason, participants were asked to give three reasons why they had 
made each selection. A copy of the questionnaire can be requested from the 
authors. It is worth highlighting at this stage that the assessments made by 
participants regarding product vulnerability/security, although hopefully 
informed by their role within one of the chosen sectors, were simply based 
upon their views of the product in question. Weaknesses with this 
methodology include the risks of differential interpretation. Whilst one 
participant may be considering the vulnerability of a product whilst being 
carried on the street, others may be imagining its vulnerability whilst based 
within the home/office. Assessments may also be influenced by age (as well 
as gender). What is considered desirable (and therefore vulnerable) by one 
person, may not be assessed as such by another.  
 
Selection of and Production of Descriptive Reports for a Set of 
Electronic Products  
The five electronic products – MP3 players, digital cameras, personal digital 
assistants (PDAs), mobile telephones and laptop computers were selected 
due to their putative varied vulnerability to theft at the time of the research. To 
allow a sufficient level of data without placing high demands upon participants’ 
time, three models of each product type were included in the questionnaire 
i.e. three models of mobile phone, three models of PDA, and so on.  
 
The three models of each of the five product types were selected to ensure a 
balance of popularity, price, specifications and dimensions. To ensure a 
standard and repeatable methodology, products (and the information included 
on each product) were selected (and gathered) using the following process: 
 
a) Selecting the three makes/models awarded the highest score on the 
Which Best Buy guide (www.which.net). If the review of a product were 
split into categories, for example, the digital camera review included 
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best buys for cameras with less than 4Mp, 4Mp to 5Mp and 5.1Mp or 
more, the best buy model was selected from each range. 
b) Fixing a specific date on which to identify each product’s price and 
specifications;  
c) Searching three online stores to find the price of each make/model; 
d) Selecting the cheapest price from the three stores.  
 
For example, for MP3 players, the Apple iPod 20Gb was selected as the best 
buy Hard Disk MP3 player from Which online. On the 26th May 2005, the three 
websites: Dixons, PCWorld and Currys were searched to establish the price 
for which they sold this product. All three sold the product for £189.99; 
therefore, this price was included on the stakeholder questionnaire.  
 
Selection of a Panel of Key Stakeholders 
To ensure that responses were gathered from stakeholders representing an 
equal mix of original and accession European member states, the two 
research teams (Jill Dando Institute, UK and Università Cattolica Del Sacro 
Cuore, Italy) were given a list of countries from which to select their 
participants. Each research team were asked to select three original 
European states and two accession states. This gave a total of six original 
and four accession states.   
 
Once countries had been selected, one representative (from each country) 
from the following four sectors was identified and invited to take part in the 
research: 
1. Law enforcement 
2. Consumers 
3. Manufacturers of electronic products 
4. Insurance 
 
The selection of countries from each of these lists, and stakeholders from 
each of the above sectors involved a snowball process generally starting with 
the countries in which the research team was based, i.e. Italy and the UK. 
Countries were selected based upon the number of stakeholders from that 
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country who were willing to take part. An example of the steps taken to select 
stakeholders is outlined belowii: 
1. Using the UK as a starting point, a number of contacts from within 
each of the four sectors (as well as academics) were asked to provide 
details of individuals working within these sectors from the UK; 
2. Individuals were contacted and asked if they would be willing to 
complete the questionnaire; 
3. Individuals were also asked if they would be willing to provide 
names/contact details of their counterparts in the additional eleven 
countries. 
4. These contacts from the additional countries were then asked if they 
would be willing to take part, and also asked for details of those 
working within their field from alternative countries; 
5. This process continued until the five countries with the most 
participants willing to take part were selected; 
 
At the end of this process 31 (out of a possible 40) contacts agreed to 
complete, and were sent the questionnaire. Twenty-two participants returned 
completed questionnaires within the required deadline.   
 
Dissemination of the Questionnaire 
Once participants had been selected, they were contacted by e-mail, which 
explained the background of the project, the role of the questionnaire as part 
of the wider project, the task they were being asked to complete and the likely 
deadlines involved. The introductory e-mails did not include the questionnaire.  
 
Once the stakeholder had agreed in principle, the e-mail was followed by a 
phone-call (where possible and appropriate) explaining the project in more 
detail and clarifying any uncertainties that they may have. This stage of the 
process was also used to discuss issues such as anonymity and the preferred 
language into which participants would require the questionnaire to be 
translated.  
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Once a stakeholder had agreed to take part, the questionnaire was sent 
electronically. Approximately one week before the first deadline, participants 
were sent an e-mail (or received a phone call) reminding them about the 
questionnaire and asking them to let the research teams know if they were 
facing any difficulties. If participants asked for an extension to the deadline, 
this was offered. Those participants who did not ask for an extension and did 
not return the questionnaire were sent several reminders until the stage where 
time would not allow their inclusion. To this end, it is suggested that every 
step was taken to accommodate as many participants as possible. The 
number of those from whom information was obtained is frankly disappointing 
in the light of the efforts taken to recruit respondents, and is attributed 
primarily to the perception that crime risk is a matter of criminal inclination 
rather than criminal opportunity.  
 
Collection and Analysis of Data 
The analysis detailed in the results section below focused upon the 
association between vulnerability and security for each of the 15 products; the 
association between vulnerability and security for product type (i.e. mobile 
phone, PDA etc.); variations in perceptions between respondents from each 
sector and finally qualitative analysis of respondents’ definitions of 
vulnerability and security 
 
RESULTS 
Participants 
As noted above, the original aim was to interview four participants (one from 
each of the four sectors – law enforcement, insurance, consumers’ 
associations and manufacturers of electronic products) from ten European 
countries. Although the research teams contacted many stakeholders from 
each of these sectors from a variety of European countries, the final 
responses analysed below reflect the views of 21 participants from nine 
European countries. Five of these countries are original and four are 
accession European member states. The extreme difficulty of recruiting 
respondents may itself be indicative of the fact that the notion of crime-
reductive design of electronic products is not yet something which engages 
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the interest and attention of many of those whose involvement would be 
necessary to successful implementation of a risk-based assessment of 
electronic products.   
 
Table 3 below displays the number of participants who took part from each 
country. The results reveal that only the UK and Italy achieved the maximum 
four respondents. Three respondents took part from the Czech Republic, two 
from Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Sweden and one from Spain and the 
Netherlands.   
 
Table 3 about here  
 
In addition to the four participants from ten countries, the research team 
invited the views of those working for the European Standardisation 
Organisations (ESOs) ETSI, CEN and CENELEC. One response was 
returned from ETSI making the total number of respondents 22.  
 
Table 4 below shows that of a possible 10 (one from each of ten countries), 
seven respondents represented the insurance sector, six represented the law 
enforcement sector, six represented consumers’ associations, two 
respondents represented manufacturers of electronic products and one 
respondent represented ESOs.  
 
Table 4 about here.  
 
Vulnerability versus Security 
Although the main aim of the research was to utilise responses to the 
questions ‘what makes a product vulnerable/secure’ to design a revised crime 
risk assessment mechanism, the research also aimed to assess variations in 
perceptions of vulnerability and security between individual products i.e. Apple 
iPod 20GB, by product type i.e. MP3 player and by the sector of each 
respondent i.e. manufacturers. As was highlighted within the methodology 
section, respondents were asked to review the details of 15 electronic 
products (photo, dimensions, price, weight, specifications) and make 
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judgements regarding that product’s vulnerability and security. A product 
perceived to have low vulnerability/security would be awarded 1 point, a 
product awarded medium vulnerability/security would be awarded 2 points 
and a product considered to have high levels of vulnerability/security would be 
awarded 3 points. As there were a total of 22 respondents, the minimum 
score awarded to a product i.e. the lowest level of vulnerability/security would 
be 22 (22 x 1) and the highest would be 66 (22 x 3).  
 
Figure 1 displays the aggregate vulnerability and security scores for each of 
the 15 electronic products. The products to the left of the graph are those with 
very little variation between the perceived levels of vulnerability and security. 
For example, the Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 has a vulnerability score of 49 
and a security score of 47. In contrast, the products to the right of the graph 
show the greatest variation between perceived levels of vulnerability and 
security. For example, the FujiFilm Finepix S7000 has a vulnerability score of 
63 (66 being the highest possible score) and a security score of 27 (22 being 
the lowest score).  
 
 
Figure 1 about here  
 
The product considered by this sample of respondents to be the most 
vulnerable to theft was the FujiFilm Finepix S7000 digital camera, followed by 
the Apple iPod 20GB MP3 player and the Nokia 6230i mobile phone. The 
products considered to be the least vulnerable to theft included the Palm One 
Zire 72 PDA, the Toshiba Satellite M30X 150 laptop and the Olympus 
Camedia C-5060 and C-770 digital cameras. Products considered to be the 
most secure included the Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 laptop computer, the 
Motorola V600 mobile phone and the Sony Vaio VGN B1XP laptop computer. 
Products considered to be the least secure included the Palm One Tungsten 
T5 PDA, the Olympus Camedia C770 and the HP iPAQ rx3715 PDA.  
 
Products which scored higher than the mean in terms of perceived 
vulnerability and lower than the mean in terms of perceived security – 
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suggesting that thy would be the most vulnerable, were the FujiFilm Finepix 
S7000 digital camera, the Apple iPod 20GB MP3 player, the HP iPAQ rx3715 
PDA and the iAudio M3 MP3 player. The only product which scored lower 
than the mean in terms of perceived vulnerability and higher than the mean in 
terms of perceived security was the Toshiba Satellite M30X 159. 
 
As well as highlighting the variations between products, the results also 
revealed that vulnerability scores are consistently higher (irrespective of 
product) than security scores (i.e. the blue line never rises above the red line 
in figure 1). This suggests that for the sample of respondents included in this 
research, the 15 products were all perceived to have a higher level of 
vulnerability to theft than security. The mean vulnerability score for the 15 
products was 54.5, whilst the mean security score was 30.3.  
 
Product Type 
Aggregating the responses by product type i.e. MP3 player, PDA, mobile 
phone, digital camera and laptop computer, revealed that mobile phones were 
considered to be the most vulnerable to theft, with PDAs considered to be the 
least vulnerable. Laptops were considered to be the most secure, whilst PDAs 
were considered to be the least secure. The analysis also revealed that whilst 
there is little variation between the vulnerability scores awarded to each 
product type – the most vulnerable product type had a mean score of 58 and 
the least had a mean score of 50 (a difference of 8), the security scores 
showed greater variation. The most secure product had a mean security score 
of 38, whilst the least secure had a mean score of 24 – a difference of 14.   
 
Table 5 about here  
 
Sector Type and Perceptions of Vulnerability and Security 
Table 6 displays the difference between responses awarded to the sample of 
15 products by sector of respondent. The results revealed that respondents 
from law enforcement were the most likely to rate the sample of products as 
having high vulnerability to theft whilst manufacturers of electronic products 
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were less likely to perceive the sample of products to be highly vulnerable to 
theft.  
 
Table 6 about here  
 
Table 7 reveals that participants from the insurance sector were most likely to 
consider the sample of electronic products as having low levels of security. 
Participants from European Standardisation Organisations and Consumer 
organisations were the most likely to consider the sample of products as 
having high levels of existing security.  
 
Table 7 about here  
 
Defining Vulnerability – Stakeholders’ Views 
As well as ranking the 15 products in terms of their perceived vulnerability to 
theft and their perceived levels of existing security, respondents were asked 
to give three reasons for each of these ratings. The rationale behind this 
methodology was that the final crime risk assessment mechanism should be 
developed using the language of the stakeholders whose task it will be to 
implement it, rather than being imposed by criminologists. The three reasons 
given by the respondents were therefore to be used as the basis for the 
revised risk assessment mechanism.  
 
Looking first at the definition of vulnerability, Table 8 displays the responses 
given to the question ‘what makes a product vulnerable?’ alongside the 
frequency with which that response was given. To minimise the number of 
factors in any future risk assessment mechanism, the responses provided by 
respondents were clustered into common themes. For example, ‘costly’, 
‘pricy’, ‘expensive’, and ‘costs a lot’ were clustered under the heading 
‘expensive’.  To ensure that the procedure of allocating responses was valid 
and repeatable, the authors conducted the categorisation process separately 
before agreeing on common vulnerability/security factors. The results reveal 
that of a maximum potential score of 330 (22 participants multiplied by 15 
products), the most frequent response to the questions – ‘what makes a 
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product vulnerable?’ was small/light with a score of 76. Expensive was the 
second most common response (with a score of 61), followed by popular (38), 
attractive design (33) and high quality specifications (27).  
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Defining Security – Stakeholders’ Views 
The responses given by stakeholders when asked to define ‘what makes a 
product secure?’ are outlined in the table below. Although very few responses 
were given by respondents, Table 9 makes some attempt to score the 
security factors given. 
 
Table 9 about here 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results section of this paper presents the findings of the extensive 
consultation with European stakeholders and presents a draft version of the 
crime risk assessment mechanism. It is the authors’ view that the crime risk 
assessment mechanism developed as part of this project will need to be sold 
to two audiences: crime control agencies that might alert consumers to risk 
and provide cautionary advice, and manufacturers who would be asked to 
develop their products based upon the findings. The risk mechanism 
presented remains fit for purpose in relation to the first audience, but does not 
achieve the precision necessary for the second. Issues which remain 
uncertain include: 
 
a) How the clarity of the vulnerability checklist may be enhanced, 
addressing the weaknesses within the security checklist;  
b) Whether two checklists can be justified based upon the lack of 
variability in vulnerability scores awarded by respondents;  
c) How to engage manufacturers of electronic products (who represented 
just 9% of the sample);  
 20 
d) How to overcome the perverse incentives which allow consumers to 
benefit from the theft of electronic products through an upgraded 
replacement;  
e) How to produce a mechanism which is flexible enough to 
accommodate the changes in risk and protection, and  
f) How to strike a balance between the risk of miscalculating vulnerability 
and the costs of re-designing products (post manufacture) which may 
prove prohibitively expensive.  
 
The remaining sections of this paper will focus upon refining the weaknesses 
in the presentation and implementation of the mechanism before 
reconsidering some of the assumptions on which the approach taken was 
based. 
 
Improving the Vulnerability Checklist 
The task which participants undertook made no reference to the CRAVED 
framework. This was deliberate, because to frame the task in terms which 
assumed the validity of the CRAVED framework would be to assume what we 
set out to test. The downside of this is that the data do not allow a direct test 
of CRAVED.  Insofar as Table 8 can be interpreted in CRAVED terms, it 
endorses the relevance of CRAVED factors. Many of the comments clearly 
refer to CRAVED factors. Expensive means valuable, small/light reflects 
concealable, popular and desirable (and perhaps fashionable) mean 
enjoyable, and marketable means disposable. However, the meaning of other 
factors cited as contributing to vulnerability have to be interpreted. Does ‘high 
quality specifications’ stand proxy for expensive? Is ‘good brand name’ a 
marker for expensive, enjoyable, disposable, or none of these? The 
impression which we have is that CRAVED remains a good analytic 
framework. Notwithstanding this, the search for a simpler measure of 
vulnerability should be undertaken simply because simplicity in use is 
valuable. Lacking details of the actual relative vulnerability of the products 
included (which would require an enormous research project in its own right) 
the aggregate judgement of vulnerability made by our expert respondents was 
used as the benchmark for a possible simpler measure.      
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Exploratory analysis was undertaken with the variables of price, weight, price 
per unit weight and aggregate vulnerability score. Surprisingly, there was no 
relationship between price and rated vulnerability, and only a modest and 
statistically unreliable association between price per unit weight and 
vulnerability score. This pattern reproduced itself within each product type as 
well as across products. Excluding the most expensive products (laptops) 
increases the relationship between price and vulnerability, but does not render 
it statistically reliable. We must thus conclude that rated vulnerability is not 
reducible to the simpler variables of weight and price. Whether rated 
vulnerability approximates more closely to theft rates than price and weight, 
as noted above, can only be determined by a very substantial additional 
research programme. Assuming the domain experts involved as respondents 
bring knowledge and experience to the table, the conclusion is reached that 
their judgements of vulnerability cannot be reduced to simpler measures of 
weight and cost. This has to be a provisional judgement. The small range of 
vulnerability scores noted earlier remains troubling. CRAVED, in the writers’ 
view, remains the best available organising framework for vulnerability to 
theft.    
 
The Weakness of the Security Checklist 
The recommendation to be reached at the end of this paper is that the 
security checklist is not a sound basis for evaluating product security. The 
central reason is that the progress of the research, and consultations with 
respondents and others, demonstrated that this approach would impose an 
artificial ceiling upon the exercise of ingenuity and skill in crime-reductive 
engineering and design. It also understates the degree to which security is 
specific to product type. For example, most of the security measures set out 
as Table 9 are specific to individual product types or pairs of product types. 
Since no general or common security features emerge, the justification for 
standardisation disappears. With hindsight, the classic matrix (see Table 10) 
developed by Ron Clarke (see Cornish and Clarke, 2003) reflects such a 
richness of alternative methods that the checklist approach seems formulaic 
by contrast. 
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Table 10 about here  
 
What can be retrieved from the security checklist idea is the notion that when 
invited to make global estimates of security and vulnerability, vulnerability was 
virtually across the board judged greater than security. In other words, 
security is generally perceived to fall short of commensurability with 
vulnerability. 
 
Should all Portable Electronic Products be treated as Equally 
Vulnerable? 
Although the consultation process revealed that participants felt that the final 
mechanism must measure risk and protection separately and ensure that they 
are commensurate, the results presented above throw some doubt on this 
decision. The aggregate security scores, which presented the score awarded 
for the perceived security (1 being low, 2 being medium and 3 being high) of 
each of the 15 products by the 22 respondents, revealed a large mean 
difference in the scores awarded to different products. For example, PDAs 
were considered to be the least secure, with a mean (aggregate score divided 
by 3) security score of 24. Laptop computers were awarded a mean security 
score of 38. In direct contrast to this, the variation between product types for 
perceived vulnerability varies very little. The mean aggregate vulnerability 
score for PDAs (considered the least vulnerable) was 50; however, for mobile 
phones (the product considered to be the most vulnerable) this score was 
only 57.  
 
To précis, vulnerability within products of the same type varied little. Rated 
security varied much more. Do these findings suggest that all portable 
consumer electronic products of the same type are similarly vulnerable to theft 
irrespective of the level of security incorporated (within the range of security 
levels currently incorporated)? To address this point, we need to consider 
details of criminal method which are not routinely gathered. Put informally, 
there are two questions to be addressed: 
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1. Are the relevant products ‘naked’ at the point of theft? 
2. Are a non-trivial number of the products discarded, or is a theft aborted 
when a thief knows the particular model carried by the intended victim?  
 
These questions are linked in that, to the extent that the nature of products 
are not evident at the point of theft, upon being recognised for what they are, 
are they thrown away? For example a wallet stolen by an 18-year-old 
containing photo ID of a woman of 80 is of little direct value to the thief and 
may be discarded. It is believed that all the products are typically ‘clothed’ (in 
handbags, pockets or carrying cases) at the point of theft. The possible 
exception may be MP3 players, but this is unclear until we know whether they 
are stolen while in use. Mayhew and Harrington (2001) suggest that in only 
some 14% of mobile phone theft was the mobile phone the exclusive target.     
Anecdotal evidence and observation suggests that even the least valued 
portable electronic product is not without value, and is seldom or ever 
discarded. Taken together, a tenable conclusion is that perceived value may 
be the primary driver of mobile phone theft, with the other elements of craved 
taking a secondary role. 
 
What Might the Final Crime Assessment Mechanism Look Like? 
The CRAVED framework remains tenable as a framework for measuring 
product vulnerability. What is required is some measure of vulnerability 
provisionally based on CRAVED, i.e. with CRAVED prompts preceding a 
general assessment of vulnerability not constrained by answers to the 
CRAVED prompts. A group should be convened with representatives of 
manufacturers and consumer organisations. If CRAVED proves contentious, a 
threshold of value/weight for electronic products should be established above 
which the process below is followed. Assessed security should be referred on 
to a EUROPOL hosted technical group which can deem security features as 
good, adequate or insufficient with rated vulnerability, yielding a three level 
rating.  
 
Proposing a Model for Implementation 
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In terms of suggestions for future implementation, the authors propose that 
the mechanism should be used as a tool to inform the labelling of consumer 
electronic products. It is recommended that two systems should be introduced 
which will help consumers make informed decisions when purchasing 
electronic products and also allow manufacturers to market their products as 
‘Secure’. The first system would be an accreditation scheme and associated 
logo which would allow products meeting the required standards to be 
marketed as a ‘Secure Product’ (or whatever label is chosen). The exact 
specifications would be refined following further consultation, but the authors 
suggest that to be awarded this label, products must have a  security rating 
which is equal to (or higher than) the vulnerability score. If a product has a 
high vulnerability score it must have ‘good’ security features (rated by a 
EURPOL technical group). If the product has an ‘insufficient’ level of security, 
it can still be labelled as a ‘Secure Product’ as long as the vulnerability score 
is equally low.  
 
Similar systems are utilised in the food and building industry which enable 
products to be labelled as ‘Secure’ or ‘Healthy’ if they meet certain criteria. 
The ‘Healthy’ logo was proposed by the UK Food Standards Agency in their 
consultation regarding the labelling of food (see Figure 2). This system would 
allow food which met the relevant criteria, in terms of salt, sugar and fat 
content, to be labelled as ‘Healthy’ and therefore carry the logo.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
In a similar vein, the UK building industry has an accreditation scheme for 
buildings which allows them to be labelled as Secured by Design (and 
therefore marketed using the appropriate logo) where they meet the required 
standards of security (see Figure 3). The Netherlands also have an 
accreditation scheme – Police Label Secured Housing - which allows 
consumers to identify whether buildings meet certain security standards.  
 
Figure 3 about here  
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In addition to the proposed voluntary accreditation scheme and associated 
label, it is recommended that the electronics industry are invited/encouraged 
to introduce a second labelling system which would enable consumers to 
easily and immediately identify the levels of vulnerability and security of a 
product. It is proposed that this system should be based upon the ‘signposting 
system’ (currently being suggested by the UK Food Standards Agency) and 
should include two signposts (one for vulnerability and one for security) which 
would be coloured according to the product’s ratings (awarded using the 
vulnerability checklist and the EURPOL three level rating). If a product scores 
highly in terms of vulnerability to theft, the vulnerability traffic light would be 
red (i.e. stop). If the product had a medium score in terms of its vulnerability to 
theft the traffic light would be amber (i.e. proceed with caution). If the product 
had a low vulnerability to theft, the traffic light will be green (go ahead). The 
security traffic light would be coloured using the same red, amber and green, 
but the ratings would be awarded by the EUROPOL technical group as 
opposed to a formulaic security checklist. Below (Figure 4) is an illustration of 
the proposed system.  
 
Figure 4 about here (needs to be in colour)  
 
What are the authors’ reasons for proposing the two systems of presentation 
as opposed to the traffic lights alone or the accreditation scheme alone? 
Firstly, with the accreditation system alone, where products fail to achieve the 
‘Secure’ or manufacturers decide not to apply for it, the product would contain 
no information on risk of theft. With the two systems in place, a product which 
has failed to meet the relevant standards or has not applied for the 
accreditation scheme would still contain the basic information to inform 
consumers about its risk of theft. Where a label is absent, consumers may not 
associate this with a negative message. They may never have seen the 
‘Secure’ label and would therefore not make a choice based upon its 
absence. However, where the ‘Secure’ label was absent because the product 
had failed to meet the relevant criteria, the consumer would still be able to 
interpret from the traffic light system that the product had high levels of 
vulnerability and low levels of security.   
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The second rationale for suggesting the two systems is impact. Although 
further research would be required to test this assertion, it is suggested that 
the traffic light system would allow consumers to interpret with greater ease 
the information being portrayed i.e. the product is vulnerable to theft, but it is 
OK because it has high levels of security. With the accreditation scheme label 
alone, it may not be clear to consumers what the label means and why the 
product has it (or does not have it). This assertion is supported by research 
conducted into the Secured by Design label in the UK (Armitage, 2000) which 
found that although the logo would have been present on the marketing of 
properties, only 5% of residents were aware that they lived in housing 
considered to be ‘Secure’. In this case it is suggested that residents who did 
not live in Secured by Design housing (either because their properties had 
failed to comply with the standards or because the developers had decided 
not to apply for the award) would be unlikely to be aware of this deficiency in 
the security of their property.  
 
Bearing this in mind, why not recommend the use of the traffic light system 
without the accreditation scheme? The authors recommend that the two 
systems each serve a purpose and should therefore be implemented 
together. The ‘Secure’ label allows manufacturers to gain a commercial 
advantage over products without the label. It would be a simple, recognisable 
label which could be used for marketing purposes. The traffic light system 
allows consumers to immediately recognise a product’s vulnerability to theft 
as well as its existing level of security even if they have no knowledge of the 
particular accreditation scheme.  
 
Although it is proposed that the final mechanism and associated traffic light 
and accreditation schemes should be introduced on a voluntary basis, the 
authors recommend that these schemes should not be introduced in isolation 
and would need to be supported by publicity, further research, financial 
incentives and even legislation. This suggestion is informed by the 
experiences of crime reduction accreditation schemes implemented within 
other sectors. The Secured by Design voluntary accreditation scheme which 
 27 
was developed in 1989 is awarded to developers who design and build 
housing to an agreed set of standards (these include physical security, 
access, surveillance, territoriality and management and maintenance). 
Although Secured by Design has become increasingly popular over the last 
decade, this has not been achieved in isolation and a number of incentives 
are offered alongside the scheme. These incentives have been aimed at 
developers, consumers and policy makers (locally, regionally and nationally) 
and take the form of legislation, publicity and enhanced funding.  
 
CONLCUSIONS 
Engaging Manufacturers 
The prediction of crime risk, although interesting, will remain without impact 
unless those designing and manufacturing products have some incentive to 
consider the crime and disorder implications of their actions. As the results 
section of this paper showed, of the four sectors consulted, manufacturers of 
electronic products were the most difficult to engage and only represented 9% 
of the sample.  
 
As was highlighted in the discussion, although it is recommended that the 
crime risk assessment mechanism should be utilised on a voluntary basis, it is 
essential that its introduction is accompanied by publicity, research, policy and 
legislative change. For manufacturers to accept the benefits of considering 
the crime implications of their design, they must be convinced: a) That 
consumers want secure products and are willing to pay an additional premium 
for security;  b) That national, regional and local governments are taking crime 
seriously and will introduce policy and legislation that creates an environment 
in which criminogenic design will not be tolerated; c) That they 
(manufacturers) will receive a financial incentive to design secure products, 
and d) that they (manufacturers) will be able to gain commercial advantage by 
differentiating their product based upon its levels of security. For this scheme 
to achieve maximum impact, it is essential that its introduction is accompanied 
by measures to address these issues. Examples taken from the field of 
designing out crime within the built environment include: 1) The 
commissioning of research to establish whether consumers want secure 
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products and whether they are willing to pay an additional premium for these 
goods; 2) Legislation to extend the powers of Section 17 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act to the private sector (and to whole of Europe); 3) Financial 
incentives for manufacturers who design secure products (these can be 
justified through costs saved i.e. criminal justice system, insurance claims 
etc.); 4) Commissioning research to establish whether manufacturers would 
gain a commercial advantage through producing secure products.  
 
Balancing Pre-Emptive Assessments with the Risk of Miscalculation 
One of the key concerns regarding the likely success of a risk assessment 
mechanism for electronic products was that the final mechanism must be 
applicable at the prototype stage as any security changes required post-
production would be prohibitively expensive. The ideal scenario, like that 
found in designing out crime in the built environment, would be for 
assessments of vulnerability and security to be made before a product is 
developed to enable changes to be made to the design without requiring it to 
be rebuilt. Although this scenario is (eventually) working well within the built 
environment, with most Architectural Liaison Officers/Crime Prevention 
Design Advisors consulted at the concept stage, in an industry which moves 
as quickly as consumer electronics, there is a risk that vulnerability will be 
miscalculated. One example where vulnerability was miscalculated was set-
top boxes which enable viewers to receive digital stations. As Ekblom (2005) 
highlights, these were ideal candidates for theft in that they weighed very little, 
were very small in size and were likely to cost in excess of £100. As is often 
the case with electronics products, the level of risk of this product was altered 
almost instantly by the industry’s decision to give the boxes away whilst 
recouping costs on service subscription payments. Ekblom (2005) questions 
whether “the forecast can be estimated and particularised to a type of product, 
in its anticipated environment of use, with sufficient confidence for design 
decision-makers to say ‘we accept this product is at exceptional risk of theft 
(and it is in our interest to reduce that risk)” (Ekblom, 2005 p.25). Whilst the 
authors accept this reservation, they do not accept that the risk of 
miscalculation outweighs the risk of inaction. The dangers of miscalculation in 
assessing vulnerability involve a) overestimating vulnerability (and risking 
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disapproval from manufacturers), or b) underestimating vulnerability which 
would risk the safety of consumers. 
 
The potential negative consequences of overestimating the vulnerability of a 
product are 1) the disapproval of manufacturers due to consumers avoiding a 
product which has been mistakenly labelled as vulnerable, and 2) consumers 
taking additional security precautions to counteract a product’s vulnerability.  
 
In response to the first point, how likely is it that a miscalculation would result 
in a challenge from manufacturers? The authors propose that there are two 
reasons why this would be unlikely. Firstly, a miscalculation is more likely to 
involve a product i.e. set-top box rather than a make/model of a product. In 
this instance all manufacturers of that product would have been equally 
affected by the negative assessment rather than an individual company. The 
second reason that a challenge would be unlikely is that, like the case of set-
top boxes, the miscalculation would not be immediately apparent and may 
take months/years to come to light. Manufacturers, who would be focusing 
upon the next product, are unlikely to spend time and energy challenging an 
assessment which took place several years before. The second point, that 
consumers take additional precautions in response to an inaccurate warning 
would surely be a risk worth taking.  
 
The risk of underestimating vulnerability would be a more serious concern. 
The risk of making a false assessment is possible and is likely to be increased 
where assessments are made too early i.e. a product appears less vulnerable 
but changes in advertising/endorsements could alter its popularity. To avoid 
this, the system developed must ensure that assessments take place early 
enough to avoid expensive changes to the design of the product, but late 
enough to be able to capture all relevant information relating to the product. 
The assessment system must also be flexible enough to move with changes 
in the market.    
 
These risks highlight the need to consult extensively with manufacturers, 
retailers, designers and consumers before any system for implementation is 
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finalised. Although the risks would need to be considered carefully and 
consumers made aware of the speculative nature of the assessments, 
concerns regarding possible risks should not override the potential benefits of 
implementing this system.  
 
Is This an Exercise in Self-Delusion? 
Although interesting in its own right, the development of an assessment to 
measure the risk of theft is worthless unless manufacturers implement it and 
consumers accept it. This paper is concluded by revisiting the reservations 
highlighted in the introduction and, where feasible, proposing solutions.  
 
Addressing Perverse Incentives 
Although this should not be used as an excuse by the electronics industry to 
avoid the issue of securing their products, there are obvious weaknesses in 
the process of claiming for stolen electronic products which act as a 
disincentive for consumers to demand more secure goods. Although this is a 
valid concern which needs to be addressed, the argument that consumers are 
largely pleased to have an electronic product stolen because the insurance 
company will replace it with a newer model ignores three points: 1) That many 
small consumer electronic products are uninsured; 2) That the loss of a 
product such as a laptop, MP3 player or PDA invariable means the loss of 
data and an inconvenience to the consumer; 3) That a theft of a product rarely 
takes place in isolation. The victim whose product is stolen may experience 
physical injury, emotional trauma or even death. Recent media reports have 
highlighted these issues. Both the Sunday Times (UK) and the Daily 
Telegraph reported in late 2005 and early 2006 that street robbery was 
soaring as muggers target iPod users (Street Robbery Soars as iPod Users 
Targeted, 2005; Street Robberies Soar as Muggers Target iPod Users, 2006). 
This problem has also been widely reported in the USA with coverage of 
Steve Jobs (Apple computers) personally contacting the family of a teenager 
killed for his iPod (Jobs Calls Family of Stabbing Victim, 2006). Opposing the 
proposed system of securing electronic products on the premise that 
consumers will not want to avoid theft and would prefer to become a victim of 
crime if they receive a new phone is both unconvincing and uninformed.  
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Will Offenders Differentiate? 
A valid point highlighted throughout the consultation process is that offenders 
who steal a bag or burgle a property will not take the time to differentiate 
between secure and unsecure products. They will simply take the bag/burgle 
the property in the hope that the contents will be re-usable. One of the most 
effective methods of avoiding this would be to maximise the number of 
products which achieve the ‘Secure Product’ label, thus reducing the odds 
that the bag taken by an offender will contain any usable products. Reducing 
the likely benefits of stealing a bag (or burgling a property) would in turn 
reduce the appeal of such a target.  
 
You Cannot Ask Manufacturers and Designers to Develop Undesirable 
Products 
The final criticism is a misconception which must be addressed. The aim of 
the proposed system is not to encourage manufacturers and designers to 
develop products which will not be attractive to consumers, the aim is to 
ensure that the products which are highly desirable (due to their popularity 
and value) are equally secure. Manufacturers obviously want their products to 
be attractive to consumers, and there is no suggestion that products should 
be made less popular, fashionable or desirable. Rather that the factors which 
make the product attractive to consumers are accompanied by commensurate 
security factors which make them unattractive to offenders.   
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i
 This took place at the MARC Crime Proofing Steering Group. Even though partners were given a 
detailed explanation of the checklists, and how to apply them, the scores still differed between them.  
ii
 This example is based upon the JDI research team’s experience and was replicated for the Università 
Cattolica Del Sacro Cuore team starting with Italy.  
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